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Abstract
Engineering systems designed specifically for space applications of-
ten exhibit a high level of autonomy in the control and decision-making
architecture. As the level of autonomy increases, more emphasis must
be placed on assimilating the safety functions normally executed at the
hardware level or by human supervisors into the control architecture of
the system. This paper details the development of a decision-making
structure which utilizes information on system safety. A quantita-
tive measure of system safety, called the safety self-information, is
defined. This measure is analogous to the reliability self-information
defined by Mclnroy and Saridis, but includes weighting of task con-
straints to provide a measure of both reliability and cost. An example
is presented in which the safety self-information is used as a decision
criterion in a mobile robot controller. The safety self-information is
shown to be consistent with the entropy-based Theory of Intelligent
Machines defined by Saridis.
r
Iw
I
m
n
i
i
m
1 Introduction
Safe operation is a consideration whenever an engineering system is designed
and constructed. Research in the safety of robotic systems has been concen-
trated in three areas: human factors, such as the layout of control panels,
teach pendants, and mechanical guards; robot factors, such as perimeter
safety zones and "watchdog" safety systems; and systems issues, such as
fault-tree analysis of robot accidents and operator training [1]. Each of these
issues can be categorized as "hardware level" approaches to safety; the goal
of these approaches is to minimize the risk of accidents caused by human
interference with the robotic system, and provide emergency shutdown of
the system when an accident is imminent or has occurred.
Although each of these safety issues may be relevant in the construction
of highly autonomous and fully autonomous systems, the ideas are gener-
ally drawn from safety approaches in fixed automation systems, which op-
erate within highly specified physical constraints over a well-defined set of
parameters. They fail to address the needs of highly autonomous systems,
particularly those designed to perform ill-defined tasks in unstructured envi-
ronments. In addition, only the safety of the human operator is considered;
in autonomous systems, the safety of the system with regard to environmen-
tal hazards must also be taken into account. Consider, for example, a mobile
robotic platform operating as an exploration vehicle on unknown terrain. Al-
though it would be necessary to provide standard safety features, such as a
bumper system hardwired to stop the drive motors in the event of collision,
other standard safety features would fall short in fully safeguarding the sys-
tem. A safety fence cannot be built around the terrain to be explored; the
controller of the robotic system must be capable of assessing potential envi-
ronmental hazards and making control decisions with this hazard assessment
in mind. In addition, the controller must be capable of weighing potential
risks to the system with the urgency of the task to be performed; the con-
troller should be capable of making a control decision when it may become
necessary to violate an operating specification in order to complete an urgent
task.
This paper presents a method for assessing the level of safety of various
plans for performing a task in an autonomous system. A quantity known as
the safety self-information (SS[) will be introduced. This quantity will be a
reflection of both the probability that a plan will violate a task specification,
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as well as the potential hazard to the system caused by violating that specifi-
cation. This work is based on the reliability analysis for Intelligent Machines
formulated by McInroy and Saridis [2-4]. The approach will be demonstrated
in a case study of a mobile robot performing a task with a dynamic obstacle
in the environment. In addition, since the safety analysis is to be used as
a decision-making tool within the Hierarchical Control structure for intelli-
gent machines, the SSI will be shown to be consistent with the principle of
Increasing Precision with Decreasing Intelligence [5,6].
2 Safety Analysis for Autonomous Systems
Safety analysis for autonomous systems is concerned with selecting a plan
for executing a specified task based on minimizing the potential risk to the
system. The analysis is probabilistic in nature; it is assumed that knowledge
obtained from sensors and contained in the data base of the autonomous
system controller contains a degree of uncertainty, and can be modeled as a
random variable. Safety analysis is based on reliability theory, but provides
augmentation of reliability with cost information to establish a measure of
risk to the autonomous system. In this section, a review of reliability theory
will be presented. From this background, a method of safety analysis for
autonomous systems will be proposed. The Theory of Intelligent Machines
will be introduced, and the proposed safety analysis will be shown within the
structure of intelligent machines.
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2.1 Reliability Analysis
In order to develop safety analysis for autonomous systems, a review of re-
liability theory is necessary. Safety analysis uses as its basis the following
definition of structural reliability, presented by Ang and Tang [7], and applied
to Intelligent Machines by McInroy and Saridis [2-4].
Consider a system whose states are defined by a set of i random variables,
zi. These states represent sensor data or knowledge contained in a data base
for use by the intelligent controller of the autonomous system. The task to
be performed is described by a series of performance functions, which are
functions of the system states, each denoted 9(X). The performance func-
tions are defined such that if the specification is not violated, then g(X) > 0;
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failing to meet the specification results 9(X) <_ O. With these definitions,
the reliability index/3 is defined as the minimum distance between the ori-
gin of a set of uncorrelated standard normal variates derived from the state
variables X and the failure surface g(X) = 0. Physically,/3 can be thought
of as the "distance" between the current state of the system and a state at
which the specification in question would be violated. In the case where the
xi are uncorrelated Gaussian random variables with mean /_i and standard
deviation _ri, and g(X) is a linear specification of the following form:
g(x) = + E (1)
i
the reduced variates can be determined by:
, zi - #i
z i= ,i= 1,2,...,n (2)
and the reliability index/3 can be determined by:
=
/3 = ao + E_ a_ (3)
= =
L_
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From this, the reliability can be measured by:
R= ¢(9) (4)
where _(.) is the normal cumulative distribution function. Methods for cal-
culating the reliability index and reduced variates for other standard distri-
butions and nonlinear specifications can be found in Ang and Tang[7].
The reliability calculated using this method is known as the system reli-
ability, and can be interpreted as the probability that a given task specifica-
tion will not be violated. For tasks with multiple specifications, reliabilities
of parallel specifications must be combined using the following relationship:
= t- II(t- R,) (5)
i
After reducing parallel reliabilities such that only a set of series reliabilities
remain, the overall reliability of a system performing the specified task can
be computed as follows:
Riot = R1R2...R_, (6)
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McInroy and Saridis propose that for an Intelligent Machine, this con-
cept of system reliability can be viewed as a flow of reliability information
through the Hierarchical Control structure. They define the reliability self-
information (asI), denoted I(R), as follows:
z(R) = -log(}{) (7)
It can be shown that by definition of RS[, reliability can be treated in a frame-
work consistent with the Theory of Intelligent Control [2,9]. By evaluating
the RSI for a list of plans generated by an autonomous system controIler and
selecting the most reliable plan, an intelligent control system can use this
reliability analysis as a design tool [2-4].
Reliability analysis can be used to determine the probability that a task
specification is met. However, in using the RSI as a means of selection
of a plan for task execution, it is implied that all task specifications are
of equaI importance; no information regarding the priority of specifications
or the cost of violating a given specification are included in the analysis.
Consider the situation where multiple specifications define a given task, i.e.
a robot performing a peg insertion with specifications on gripper position,
gripper overshoot, and execution time. Implicitly, there are economic costs
associated with the violation of constraints; in the example case, assume that
violation of the position and overshoot constraints will cause damage to the
workpiece, while violation of the execution time specification will result in a
delay of mission and increases in mission costs. In this case, a decision based
solely on RSI will ignore the costs associated with the specifications; perhaps
an alternative analysis could be performed which would weigh the relative
costs of workpiece replacement and mission time, prioritize the specifications
based on this weighting, and calculate some decision index analogous to the
RSI but including a weighting function. The following anaIysis will result in
a quantity defined as the safet!l self-in.tbrmation (SSI), which can be viewed
as a weighted measure of reliability. It is proposed that this SSI quantity can
be used in a decision-making structure of an Intelligent Machine.
2.2 Safety Analysis and Safety Self-Information
Consider the system used in the derivation of RSI presented in Section 2.I:
a system whose states are represented by n uncorrelated Caussian random
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variables :r,, each with a known expected value #i and standard deviation
cri, designated to perform a task described by rn specifications, 9k(X). With
each specification, there is an economic cost associated with violation of that
specification, denoted Ck. Using these definitions, a safety analysis resulting
in the calculation of the SSI will be derived. From the standpoint of an
autonomous system, safety analysis will be defined as the measurement and
reduction of risk to an autonomous system. In the course of the analysis,
risk is measured as the penalty incurred by the system when a specification is
violated. Often, this penalty is defined as an economic cost, such as the cost
of replacing a part damaged when a specification is violated, or the cost of
repeating a task which is performed improperly. In the presentation of this
analysis, this economic definition of penalties will be used; however, it should
be noted that cost information is used as a relative weighting function, and
non-economically based weighting functions may be substituted for economic
cost information in the analysis.
The philosophy of the safety analysis is as follows: in the calculation
of the reliability of a plan, the statistics of the random variables describing
system states are used to calculate the probability that a given constraint
will not be violated. In order to focus the analysis on constraints which are
most costly, information regarding the states of the system will be treated as
more uncertain when misestimated state information could result in greater
risk to the system. To accomplish this, the standard deviations of the state
variables are modified according to the weighting of the constraint being
analyzed; the standard deviations of the state variables are increased pro-
portionally to increased cost. This has the effect of "stretching out" the
distributions of state variables when calculating the probability of violating
costly constraints; in essence, risk is introduced into the safety analysis by
assuring that costly constraints are met with a greater "factor of safety". By
introducing a higher level of uncertainty into the analysis in areas of greater
risk, reliability information is augmented with cost information.
The calculation of the SSI is as follows: numerical cost vaIues for each
constraint are normalized to provide a measure of relative costs. These rela-
tive costs are defined by:
Ck
= b. n (s)
where Cmi, is the minimum cost of all Ck. This relative cost value is then
used to modify the distribution of all state variables used in the specification
g_(X). It is used as a multiplier for the standard deviation, yielding a term
analogous to the reliability index, known as the safety indez v), computed as
follows:
ao -1- _i ait-zi
= (9)
Utilizing the normalized, zero-mean, Gaussian cumulative distribution func-
tion, the safety factor, S, can be computed:
s = (to)
Similarly to the RSI, the SSI, denoted F(S) is computed as follows:
F(S) = -log(S)
Physically, the SSI can be viewed as a measure providing a more conservative
estimate of system reliability, in which specifications carrying a greater risk
are met with a higher degree of certainty. Numerically, the SSI can be used
as an index on which to base safety-related decisions in the control structure
of an intelligent machine. An illustrative example is provided in Section 3.
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2.3 Safety Self-Information and the Theory of Intel-
ligent Machines
The safety analysis presented in this paper is intended to be used as a design
and analysis tool for the control of autonomous systems. The development
of general tools for the design of Intelligent Machines has been addressed by
Saridis [5,6]. The method proposed by Saridis is summarized in the Theory
of Intelligent Machines. In this section, it will be shown that safety analysis
based on the principle of the SSI is consistent with the general framework of
the Theory of Intelligent Machines, and can be integrated into hierarchical
control structures developed utilizing the principles of this theory.
The Theory of Intelligent Machines is a design and analysis method de-
veloped by Saridis to provide a theoretical structure for intelligent control
systems. The theory unifies concepts from Artificial Intelligence, Operations
Research, and Control Theory; in this theory, machine intelligence is mod-
eled as a flow of information through the hierarchical control structure of
the Intelligent Machine [5,6]. A fundamental concept of the Theory of In-
telligent Machines is the Principle of Increasing Precision with Decreasing
EL_
m
B
E_
w
-:j .
Intelligence. It will be shown in this section that the information provided
by the safety self-information quantity is consistent with this principle, and
can be used within the hierarchical structure of the Intelligent Machine.
In short, the Principle of Increasing Precision with Decreasing Intelligence
states that Machine Intelligence (MI) operates on facts in a database (DB)
to produce a rate of knowledge flow in the machine (R):
(MI):(DB)_(R)
This implies that for a constant rate of knowledge R, machine intelligence is
larger for a small database. As shown by McInroy and Saridis [2], reliability
self-information can be interpreted within the framework of this principle; at
the tow levels of an intelligent machine, a decrease in the size or accuracy
of the database must be countered with an increase in control performance
to maintain a constant RSI. The same can be said to be true for the SSI.
As shown in Equations 9-11, the SSI is shown to be directly proportional to
both the uncertainty of the state variable measurements and the costs asso-
ciated with the task specifications; for measurements with a large variance or
specifications with a large associated cost, the SSI becomes large, indicating
a decreased level of safety. To counter this decrease in the level of safety
caused by an increase the uncertainty of information in the database, in-
creased control performance must be obtained. In this manner, the Principle
of Increasing Precision with Decreasing Intelligence is shown to be applicable
to analysis using the SSI. In addition, since the safety analysis makes use of
a self-information term calculated on a logarithmic scale, it can be described
by the same mathematical properties as entropy. This interpretation of SSI
as an analog to entropy provides a convenient method for incorporating SSI
into the information theoretic setting of the Theory of Intelligent Machines.
3 Example: A Safety-Based Decision Struc-
ture for a Mobile Robot
In this section, the safety analysis presented in Section 2 will be applied to
a simplified problem which is representative of the type encountered in an
autonomous mobile robotic environment. The results of a reliability analysis
will be contrasted with the results of the safety analysis. The analysis will
7
= =
n
m
m
m
T
g
m
be shown to be consistent with the structure of the Theory of Intelligent
Machines.
3.1 Problem Statement
A mobile robot, rl, is operating in an environment with a dynamic obstacle,
r2 (see Figure 1). The positions of rl and r2 are known exactly, as shown
in Figure 1. It is known with perfect certainty that r2 is traveling at 3
m/s along a straight path perpendicular to the path of rl, which is also
straight. The velocity of the robot rl can be obtained from sensors; the sensor
currently reads 5 m/s, and the sensor information is known to be normally
distributed with a standard deviation of 0.1 m/s. A collision between rl and
r2 will result in damage to the bumper of rl, which will yield repair costs
of $500. The mission to be completed is to transport collected soil samples
out of the collection area before contamination occurs; therefore, rl must
move at least 4.5 m along the current path in 1 s. If contamination occurs,
the mission will have to be repeated and more soil samples will need to be
collected, at a cost of $200. Additionally, it is known that the drive motor
of rl has speed limitations, and the motor will be damaged at velocities
greater than 6.1 m/s. Motor replacement bears a cost of $900. At this stage
of autonomous planning, the intelligent control structure must be used to
select an acceleration profile for rl. Three options are available: accelerate
at 1 m/s 2, maintain constant velocity, or decelerate at 1 m/s 2. It is assumed
for simplicity that the decision will be made instantaneously, and cannot be
changed again during the course of operation.
In order to proceed with reliability and safety analysis, the task specifi-
cations must be posed in standard notation. Using the format introduced in
the previous section, the task specifications can be written as a set of four
constraint equations:
For the velocity specification:
gl(v,a) = 6.1 - v - at > 0 (12)
For the mission specification:
g2(v,a) = vt+_at _ -4.5 > 0 (13)
=2
r
m
m
=
For collisionavoidance:
g3(v,a)= 5- vt-!at_> 0 (14)2
g_(,,a)= vt+ _t_- 5> 0 (15)
where v isthe velocityof rl,a isthe accelerationofrl,and t isthe elapsed
time. For simplicity,we willconsider a time intervalof 1 s. Let the three
accelerationprofiles(accelerate,maintain constant velocity,and decelerate)
be denoted P1, P_, and P3, respectively.
3.2 Reliability Analysis
Using reliability analysis, each of the three p[ans (P1, P2, and P3) will be
evaluated. The plan with the smallest RSI, I(R), will be selected as the most
reliable plan. The reliability of P1, where a = lm/s 2, can be determined as
follows:
For specification gl(a,v) = 5.1 - v > 0:
5.1 - #,_
fll - (16)
_/((-I)(i))_
With #. - 5re s, thiscan be evaluated as:
_i = 1.0
Evaluating the cumulative distributionfunction:
= 0.8413
Repeating this analysis for each of the remaining three specifications yields:
_2 = 9.0; R_ " i
#3 = -5.0; R3 _- 0
#4=5.0;R4 _ i
9
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Since specifications g3 and g4 can be viewed as parallel specifications, their
reliabilities can be combined as follows:
(18)
=1
For the total reliability of P1, consider R1, R2, and R3.4 in series:
Rtot,1= RI R_R3,4
= 0.8413
Calculation of the RSI of P1 follows directly from this:
z,(R) = -iog(R,o,,,) (19)
= 0.0750
Similar analysis can be used to evaluate the RSI of P2 and Pa-
of the RSI yields the following results: For P_:
Calculation
R1 _- 1;R2 _- 1;R3,4 = 0.75
For P3:
h(R) =0.1249
Rl _-- 1; R2 = 0.1587; R3,4 _ ]
/3(R) =0.7994
Therefore, from a reliability standpoint, P1 should be selected. The results
are summarized in Table 1.
Further analysis of these results shows that each plan results in a nonzero
probability of violating one of the operating specifications while meeting the
other two specifications with almost perfect certainty: P1 will perform the
mission and avoid a collision with nearly perfect reliability, but resuIts in
a 16% chance of exceeding the maximum velocity; P_ has a 25% chance of
colliding with the moving obstacle, but will meet the mission specification and
stay within the velocity bounds with nearly perfect certainty; and Pa results
in an 84% chance of not meeting the mission specification, but will stay
within the velocity bounds and avoid collision with nearly perfect reliability.
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Since no cost penalties are included in the reliability analysis, and since each
plan results in a nonzero probability of failure of only one specification, PI
is chosen because it offers a higher reliability with respect to the velocity
constraint than does either P2 with respect to the collision specification or
Pa with respect to the required task.
It is clear from this analysis that P1 offers the plan with the highest
probability of meeting all task constraints. However, looking at the costs
associated with violation of the specifications as stated in the problem state-
ment may complicate this result. Although P1 offers the greatest probability
of meeting all three specifications, the constraint it has the highest probabil-
ity of violating is the velocity constraint. The assigned cost values show that
this specification has the highest associated cost. In this scenario, it may
be preferable to select another plan; one which is not as reliable, but has a
higher probability of meeting the costly velocity constraint, while relaxing
the less costly collision or mission specifications. For this type of analysis, a
decision based on SSI: may be employed.
3.3 Safety Analysis
Safety analysis is performed using the methods described in Section 2.2. The
analysis is as follows:
First, costs are normalized:
$900
c_ = $200
= 4.5
$200
c2 = $200
= 1.0
$5@
ca,4- $200
= 2.5
These cost values are now used for calculation of the safety index, _. For
PI"
5 - #.
=
11
= =
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With #_ = 5.0 and cl = 4.5, _1 can be computed as:
_1 = 0.4938
Evaluating the cdf yields a safety factor, $1, of:
=
= 0.6983
Similar analysis can be used for g2, g3, and g4- Computation yields the
following results:
$2 _- 1.0
$3 = 0.0228
$4 = 0.9772
As with the RSI calculation, reduction of parallel specifications and combi-
nation of series specifications can be used to yield the total safety factor of
Stot,1 = 0.6827
From this, the SSI can be found directly:
F,(S) = -log(S,o,,,) (22)
= .1658
Repeating this analysis for P_ and Pa yields:
F (S) = . 28t
F3(S) = .7994
These results are summarized in Table 2. Choosing the p|an with the lowest
associated SSI results in selection of P2- Although it has been shown that
P1 is the most reliable plan, safety analysis shows that P; has the lowest
associated risk; from this definition of safety, P; is the safest plan. Although
it allows for a higher probabiIity of violating the mission specification than
does P1 with the velocity specification, the lower cost of violating the mission
specification outweighs the higher probability of violation. In effect, this
analysis has tightened the bounds on the velocity constraint to account for
its higher associated cost.
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3.4 Consideration of the Theory of Intelligent Ma-
chines
As was stated in Section 2.3, the Theory of Intelligent Machines is a design
and analysis tool developed by Saridis to provide a theoretical structure
for intelligent control systems. Safety analysis using SSI was shown to be
consistent with this theory. This can be further demonstrated by considering
the example problem.
Combination of Equations 3 and 9 yield the following relationship:
_,j, = _ (23)
ck
This implies that for specification k with associated cost ck, the safety in-
dex _ of plan i is directly proportional to the reliability index fl of plan
i with respect to specification k. In the example case, the largest cost is
associated with the velocity constraint; therefore, when evaluating each of
the three plans, the velocity measurement is treated as most uncertain when
evaluating the safety index associated with specification 1. As shown in
Equation 23, the use of a high cost value results in a decreased safety in-
dex and a corresponding increase in the SSI, indicating a decreased level of
safety. As suggested by the Principle of Increasing Precision with Decreasing
Intelligence presented in Section 2.3, this decreased level of safety must be
countered with an increase in control performance; in this case, Equation 23
shows that the selection of a plan with a high reliability index with respect
to specification 1 will counter the decrease in the level of safety caused by the
cost-induced uncertainty. Using this result, safety analysis using the SSI can
be viewed as a method of selecting plans which yield the highest weighted
combination of specification reliabilities, requiring more reliable control with
regard to more costly specifications. As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, plan
P_ is judged as the safest plan since it is highly reliable with respect to
costly constraint l, even though its overall reliability is lower than that of
Pz, which is less reliable with respect to constraint 1. By considering control
reliability to be a measure of precision and cost-induced uncertainties as a
decrease in intelligence, the Principle of Increasing Precision with Decreasing
Intelligence can be seen to manifest itself in safety analysis using SSI; more
reliable control performance is expected in response to greater cost-induced
uncertainties.
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This paper has presented a quantifiable approach to safety for autonomous
systems. A review of reliability theory has been presented, and the augmen-
tation of reliability theory with cost information has been proposed. The con-
cept of safety self-information has been defined, and has been demonstrated
in a decision-making structure for a mobile robot. The safety analysis based
on safety self-information has been shown to be consistent with the principle
of Increasing Precision with Decreasing Intelligence.
Research will be continuing in the development of a quantifiable approach
to safety, tn autonomous environments, data sampling is often used as a
means of collecting information about an unstructured environment. Prob-
ability distributions determined from finite data sets contain a degree of
uncertainty characterized by confidence levels; this uncertainty will be used
to augment the safety analysis presented in this paper. Also, this analysis
does not address the issues of safety problems encountered due to failure of
hardware and software components of the system; these component reliabil-
ities will also be included in the safety analysis. In addition, the current
safety analysis can only analyze existing plans; future research may include
the use of the SSI to formulate plans. Future research may also address
the computation time issues involved in safety analysis; often quick decisions
must be made which cannot allow for a full analysis. In these cases, the need
to perform an analysis must be weighed against the urgency of the decision
at hand.
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Table 1" Reliability Analysis
R1
0.8413
1.0000
1.0000
R2
i.0000
1.0000
0.1587
R3 R4
0.0000 1.0000
0.5000 0.5000
1.0000 0.0000
0.8413
0.7500
0.1587
I(R,o,)
0.0750
0.1249
0.7994
!
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Plan
&
&
P3
S1
0.6983
0.9927
1.0000
$2
1.0000
1.0000
0.1587
Table 2: Salty Analysis
Sa & Stot
0.0228 0.9772 0.6827
0.5000 0.5000 0.7445
1.0000 0.0000 0.1587
F(S,o,)
0.1658
0.1281
0.7994
